Seray Yalaz, Bidding for governance: rebel vs. state labor-retention strategies in conflicts
In a new co-authored article in the Journal of Peace Research, SIS PhD candidate Seray Yalaz explores how rebel groups and governments compete to control and profit from natural resources. The article explores how profit plays a key role in shaping how rebel groups govern and how states respond, challenging the common idea that governance is driven only by the search for legitimacy, or that resource wealth always undermines effective rule.
Yalaz and her co-authors introduce a new way of understanding natural resources by grouping them based on how much they depend on human labor, determined by whether extraction is highly mechanized or labor-intensive. This helps explain how both rebels and states compete not just for profits, but for control over people and production. Rebel groups often build systems that resemble state institutions, while governments respond by offering benefits or concessions to communities in contested areas.
Using existing data on rebel governance and resource extraction, along with a new dataset on government concessions, Yalaz and her co-authors find that when rebel organizations profit from labor-dependent resources, it incentivizes both rebels and states to govern constituents.. However, the strategies they use depend on how strong their position is, as groups tend to diversify their approaches only when they have a competitive advantage.
The findings demonstrate how economic conditions shape the behavior of both rebel groups and governments, and how they engage with civilians in conflict zones.
Read the full article here.